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THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT AND THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT ON
THE TEST FOR THE DETERMINATION OF

CUSTODY FOR PURPOSES OF
WiLLIAM F.

Miranda

NAGEL*

INTRODUCTION

Miranda v. Arizona1 requires that "custodial interrogation" be preceded by an advisement designed to protect the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination.
This Article discusses the substantial differences between the approaches used by the Colorado Supreme Court2 and
the U.S. Supreme Court in determining when there is "custody" for purposes of triggering Miranda warnings.
The U.S. Supreme Court has approached "custody" by focusing on
the setting of the interrogation in terms of the concerns addressed in Miranda-that is, the effect of a police-dominated atmosphere on the exercise of Fifth Amendment rights. The Court emphasized that Miranda
warnings are only required in limited situations. The Court recognized
that there is inherent coercion when police question a suspect, but it has
held that such coercion alone does not trigger Miranda. The determination of custody, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, is based on whether
there is "a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the
3
degree associated with a formal arrest."
The Colorado Supreme Court has, on occasion, acknowledged each
of these principles. It has, however, taken a different approach to custody,
focusing on whether a reasonable person would feel he has been "deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way" under the "totality
of the circumstances." 4 Colorado decisions have not given consistent attention to the inquiry the U.S. Supreme Court has said is controlling*
Appellate Chief Deputy District Attorney, Twentieth Judicial District, Boulder, Colorado; B.A. Swarthmore College, 1972; J.D. University of Colorado School of Law, 1980. The
author prepared this Article after litigating the issue of custody in two recent interlocutory
appeals. People v. LaFrankie, 858 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1993) petition for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W.
3454 (U.S. Dec. 28, 1993); People ex rel. J.C., 844 P.2d 1185 (Colo. 1993). The guidance of
John D. Dailey, Colorado Deputy Attorney General, Nathan B. "Ben" Coates, Denver Chief
Appellate Deputy District Attorney, and Robert F. Nagel, Professor, University of Colorado
School of Law, is gratefully acknowledged.
1. 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966).
2. The Colorado Supreme Court premises its discussions with references to "Miranda
rights." The cases do not suggest the analysis is based on distinct principles from the Colorado Constitution; to the contrary, the language and citations of the Colorado Court demonstrate that federal law is being applied.
3. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason,
429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984); Minnesota
v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430-31 (1984).
4. People v. Horn, 790 P.2d 816, 818 (Colo. 1990).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:2

whether the person was subjected to restraints associated with arrest.
Instead, the Colorado Supreme Court states "[t]he essential element of
custody is that a reasonable person in the suspect's position would feel
that he is not free to leave." 5 This is the test for the investigatory Terry
stop, which is a lesser seizure than arrest. 6 The U.S. Supreme Court has
said that "[t]he comparatively nonthreatening character of detention of
this sort explains the absence of any suggestion
in our opinions that Tery
7
stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda."
The Colorado Supreme Court has not followed the controlling doctrine from the U.S. Supreme Court on the meaning of custody under Miranda, The essential Colorado Supreme Court determination, "not free to

leave,"8 is the test for lesser seizures that are not subject to the dictates of
Miranda pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court. Under controlling U.S.
Supreme Court doctrine triggering Miranda requirements, the restraints
imposed by police must be associated with formal arrest, not with lesser
seizures.
I.

A.

THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE: RESTRAINTS
ASSOCIATED WITH ARREST

Miranda

The root of the issue is the definition of custodial interrogation in
Miranda-questioning "after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 9 This
definition appears to have two prongs: (1) custody and (2) any other significant deprivations of freedom. Obviously, to be arrested is to be taken
into custody. The question is what other restraints are "significant," given
the concerns addressed by Miranda, to trigger the advisement that must
precede custodial interrogation.
In Miranda, the Court described at great length the situations and
practices that were "essential to our decisions today." 10 Miranda involved
station house interrogations. The Court described custody as "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere."'I
The Court said such an atmosphere involved "inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to com12
pel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely."
The Court explained that incommunicado custodial interrogation
makes physical and psychological coercion possible. Custody involves "iso5. People v. Thomas, 839 P.2d 1174, 1179 (Colo. 1992).
6. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). See generally Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that person); California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
7. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440.
8. Thomas, 839 P.2d at 1179.
9. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
10. Id. at 445.

11. Id.
12. Id. at 467.
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lation and unfamiliar surroundings,"' 3 as well as great uncertainty. Police
can exploit being alone with the person under interrogation, even to the
extent of disregarding requests to speak with relatives or an attorney. The
Court summarized:
[T]he setting prescribed by the manuals and observed in practice
becomes clear. In essence, it is this: To be alone with the subject
is essential to prevent distraction and to deprive him of outside
support. The aura of confidence in his guilt undermines his will
to resist....

Patience and persistence, at times relentless ques-

tioning, are employed.... It is important to keep the subject off
balance, for example, by trading on his insecurity about himself
or his surroundings. The police then persuade,
trick, or cajole
14
him out of exercising his constitutional rights.
This language combines a description of situations that allow coercive
techniques to be employed (i.e., the custodial setting), with descriptions of
those techniques (i.e., patience and persistence, relentless questioning,
trading on insecurity, persuading, cajoling, trickery). The reasoning from
Miranda does not, therefore, clearly distinguish "custody" from interrogation techniques that can be more easily abused when interrogations occur
in a custodial setting. It took several subsequent decisions for the
Supreme Court to clarify the types of restraints that trigger the requirements of Miranda.
B.

Orozco: Emphasis on Arrest.

In Orozco v. Texas,15 the Court found an interrogation conducted in
the defendant's bedroom was custodial. Four police officers entered the
defendant's boarding house room at 4:00 a.m. and surrounded him while
he slept. 16 In spite of the police domination of the situation, the state
argued, and the dissent agreed, that because the interrogation occurred in
the suspect's own room he was not in an unfamiliar setting and Miranda
did not apply.

17

The Court rejected this argument. 18 It relied heavily on the testimony of one of the officers that "[f rom the moment he gave his name...
petitioner was not free to go where he pleased but was 'under arrest."'
The Court gave no attention to the lack of evidence indicating the defend13. Id. at 445.
14. Id. at 455.
15. 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
16. Id. at 325.
17. Id. at 326, 331.
18. Id. at 325, 327. Orozco has been cited by the Colorado Supreme Court for the proposition that an interrogation need not be at the police station to be custodial, and that one
may also be in custody at his home. See People v. Trujillo, 785 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Colo. 1990);
People v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 958, 961 (Colo. 1983); People v. Parada, 533 P.2d 1121, 1122
(Colo.1975). It has also been cited as support for "a fact specific approach" to the determination of custody. See People v. Trujillo, 784 P.2d 788, 791 n.2 (Colo. 1990). These cases overlook the significance given in Orozco to arrest as the basis for the determination of custody
under Miranda.
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ant had been formally arrested. 19 Under Orozco, custody can exist for Miranda purposes in a familiar setting, without formal arrest, provided that
police have dominated the situation to the extent that there is the functional equivalent of arrest.
C.

Beckwith and Mathiason: Custody Requires More Than a Coercive
Environment

In Beckwith v. United States,20 Internal Revenue agents interviewed the
suspect in his home for three hours concerning five years of possible criminal tax fraud. The "psychological restraints" 21 inherent in such an intimidating interrogation did not implicate Mirandabecause the situation did
not involve the compulsion "inherent in custodial surroundings." 22 The
compulsion necessary for custody came from "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere," 23 not from pressures resulting from the fact police have focused on the suspect. The
Court said the application of Miranda was grounded "on the custodial aspect of the situation, not the subject matter of the interview." 24 Because
"Beckwith was neither arrested nor detained against his will," there was no
custody.

25

The Beckwith Court explained "Mirandawas grounded squarely in the
Court's explicit and detailed assessment of the peculiar 'nature and setting
of... in-custody interrogation.'"26 The Court further emphasized that in
the cases since Miranda it had "specifically stressed that it was the custodial
nature of the interrogation which triggered its Miranda holding."27 The
Court refused to extend Miranda beyond "its own explicitly stated rationale" involving the nature of custody. Therefore, the coercive pressures on
19. The analysis of the Court in Orozco turned on the officer's "uncommunicated intentions, namely, that 'petitioner was under arrest and not free to leave when he was questioned
....
1" 1 WAYNE R. LAFAvE &JERoLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.6(c), at 492 (1984)
(quoting Ormzco, 394 U.S. at 327). The objective approach to custody later adopted by both
the U.S. and Colorado courts requires that the indicia of custody must be apparent to the
reasonable person in the suspect's position, so the unarticulated thoughts of the officer have
no bearing on the determination of custody. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442
(1984); People v. Probasco, 795 P.2d 1330, 1334 (Colo. 1990); People v. Wallace, 724 P.2d
670, 673 (Colo. 1986); People v. Black, 698 P.2d 766, 768 (Colo. 1984); People v. Johnson,
671 P.2d 958, 961 (Colo. 1983).
The objective facts of police domination in Orozco could have supported the determination of custody without the reliance on the officer's subjective intent. It is likely for this
reason that the U.S. Supreme Court has discussed Orozco as if the arrest had in fact taken
place. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494-95 (1977) (citing Orozco to demonstrate that Mirandaapplies "to questioning taking place in a suspect's home, after he has been
arrested and is no longer free to go where he pleases...." (emphasis added)); Berkemer, 468
U.S. at 439 n.28 (describing Orozco as a case in which the "suspect [was] arrested and questioned in his bedroom by four police officers.").
20. 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
21. Id. at 345.
22. Id. at 346.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 347.
25. Id. at 344.
26. Id. at 346 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966)).
27. Id. at 346.
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the suspect from being the focus of a complex criminal investigation did
28
not create a custodial situation.
In Oregon v. Mathiason,2 9 the court held the advisement of rights was
not required "simply because... the questioned person is one whom the
police suspect."3 0 Mathiason applied this principle to a station house interrogation of a parolee. The Oregon Supreme Court held that although the
defendant had not been arrested or formally detained, there was a sufficiently coercive environment for Miranda to apply.3 1 The U.S. Supreme
Court acknowledged that coercion is inherent in the authority of police to
cause the suspect to be charged with a crime, but said "police officers are
not required to administer Mirandawarnings to everyone whom they question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because
the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the ques32
tioned person is one whom the police suspect."
The Court explained it is not the "coercive environment" created by
suspicion or by police questioning that underlies Miranda.33 Rather, it is
police domination through "such a restriction on a person's freedom as to
render him 'in custody.' It was that sort of coercive environment to which
34
Mirandaby its terms was made applicable, and to which it is limited."
D.

Beheler, Murphy, and Berkemer: Custody Requires Formal Arrest or
Restraints of a Degree Associated With Arrest

In Calforniav. Beheler,35 the defendant contacted the police following
a murder, led them to the weapon, and identified the killer. Police asked
him to come to the station and told him he was not under arrest. He was
questioned for half an hour but allowed to leave. Five days later the police
arrested the defendant for murder. Although the Court did not give the
content of his statement, the facts indicated the murder occurred as
Beheler and his friends tried unsuccessfully to steal hashish.
The California Court of Appeals held that because the interrogation
of the suspect had occurred at the station house, it was custodial even
though "the indicia of arrest were not present."36 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding a "coercive environment" is not sufficient to establish a
custodial setting.3 7 Custodial interrogation only occurs "where there has
been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him 'in custody." 38 The Court then linked custody to arrest by stating that in determining whether one is in custody for purposes of Miranda, "the ultimate
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 345-46.
429 U.S. 492 (1977).
Id. at 495.
Id. at 492.
Id. at 495.

33. Id.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
463 U.S. 1121 (1983).
Id. at 1123.
Id. at 1124-25.
Id. at 1123.
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inquiry is simply whether there is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom
39
of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest."
The next year the Supreme Court based two more custody decisions
on whether there was any restraint on freedom of movement of the degree
associated with arrest. In Minnesota v. Murphy,4 0 the defendant had been
questioned but not charged in connection with a 1974 rape and murder.
In 1980 he was placed on probation for an unrelated offense. While participating in a treatment program for sex offenders required as a condition of his probation, Murphy admitted the 1974 rape and murder.4 1 The
counselor reported his admission to his probation officer. The probation
officer decided to report the admission to police, but first she had Murphy
report to her office. She told him what she had learned and discussed
with him the prior crime as well as his treatment.
Murphy was later indicted for the rape and murder. The trial court
denied his motion to suppress his statements to the probation officer, but
the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. 4 2 It reasoned that although there
was no custody in the usual sense, the probation officer should have given
Mirandawarnings because the meeting was compulsory under the conditions of probation and because the probation officer intended to inform
43
the police.
Murphy argued the interrogation at the probation office was custodial
because of (1) the power of the officer to compel attendance and to insist
upon truthful answers; (2) the fact the officer consciously sought incriminating evidence; (3) the fact Murphy did not expect such questions about
his past criminal conduct; and (4) the fact there were no others present to
guard against abuse or trickery. 44 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected each
of these arguments and reversed. It said: "Under the narrower standard
appropriate in the Miranda context, it is clear that Murphy was not 'in
custody' for purposes of receiving Miranda protection since there was no
'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest.'"45

The Court also found the probation office was not comparable to the
"unfamiliar atmosphere" of custody discussed in Miranda.46 This was
partly because Murphy was compelled to report there monthly. Moreover,
the "unfamiliar atmosphere" of concern in Mirandawas "an interrogation
environment ... created for no purpose other than to subjugate the indi39. Id. at 1125 (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)). This was a
substantial point of doctrinal change. Although the Court in Mathiason emphasized the need
for custody, it did not include the language "of the degree associated with arrest" included in
Beheler. Id.

40. 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
41. Id. at 423.
42. Id. at 425.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 431-33.
45. Id. at 430 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam))
(quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam)).
46. Id. at 433.
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vidual to the will of his examiner."47 The Court concluded its analysis with
the following statement:
[T]he coercion inherent in custodial interrogation derives in
large measure from an interrogator's insinuations that the interrogation will continue until a confession is obtained. Since Murphy was not physically restrained and could have left the office,
any compulsion he might have felt from the possibility that terminating the meeting would have led to revocation of probation
was not comparable to the pressure on a suspect who is painfully
literally cannot escape a persistent custodial
aware that he
48
interrogator.
Murphy demonstrates that a custodial setting must be "created" for the
purpose of police domination. Where the setting is not so created, but is
chosen only as a result of the circumstances, finding custody is less appropriate. In addition, the defendant must "literally" be under police domination either by being restrained physically or by the insinuation that he is
unable to escape the control of the interrogator. A fear that one might be
arrested in the future, even in the near future, does not establish custody.
Furthermore, the "belief" that one is currently under police control does
not support a determination of custody unless that belief is based on circumstances that show he is literally unable to escape the interrogation.
In Berkemer v. McCarty,49 the Court held that roadside questioning of a
motorist detained pursuant to a traffic stop was not custodial interrogation
for purposes of Miranda. Although the motorist was not free to leave until
the officer let him go, and although such a stop was a seizure for Fourth
Amendment purposes, the setting did not sufficiently impair the free exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination to require Miranda
warnings. 50
Such traffic stops are for limited purposes, of limited duration, and
are to some degree public. Under traffic stops, "[tihe fact that the detained motorist typically is confronted by only one or at most two policemen further mutes his sense of vulnerability."5 1 For these reasons "the
atmosphere surrounding an ordinary traffic stop is substantially less 'police dominated' than that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at issue
in Miranda itself."5 2 The Court compared traffic stops to Terry investigatory stops, stating "[t] he comparatively nonthreatening character of detention of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry
53
stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda"
Investigatory Terry stops are limited Fourth Amendment seizures,
short of arrest. Terry stops need only be supported by "reasonable suspicion," rather than the probable cause needed for an arrest. If there is
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S 436, 468 (1966)).
Id. at 433 (citations omitted).
468 U.S. 420 (1984).
Id. at 438-39.
Id. at 438.
Id. at 438-39 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445, 491-98 (1966)).

53. Id. at 440 (emphasis added).
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reasonable suspicion, a police officer is entitled to stop and question a
person, and detain him for a period of time that is reasonable to allay the
suspicions in a diligent manner.5" One is "seized" for Fourth Amendment
purposes when "in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave."55
After distinguishing the lesser Terry investigatory stops, the Berkemer
Court emphasized that "[i ] t is settled that the safeguards prescribed by Mirandabecome applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a 'degree associated with formal arrest.'"56 The Court then
suggested this would occur if, subsequent to the traffic stop, the motorist
"is subjected to treatment that renders him 'in custody' for practical purposes."5 7 The restraints that trigger Mirandamust be different from those
that leave a person "not free to leave" for a reasonable time and purpose
related to a traffic stop or an investigatory stop under Terry. It is restraints
of a degree associated with arrest, either practically or legally, that give
police the domination of the situation contemplated in Miranda.
Although Mirandamay have defined custodial interrogation with two
prongs, "in custody or otherwise deprived of freedom of action in any significant way,"5 8 Beckwith and Mathiason establish that custody is the ultimate issue under either. The second prong may involve less explicit
restraints than formal custody, but it does require the significant degree of
police domination which was of concern in Miranda. Similarly, the single
"ultimate inquiry" under Beheler, Berkemer, and Murphy asks whether custody has been effected through formal arrest, or restraint on freedom of
movement of the degree associated with formal arrest. The coercion that
is inherent when police interview anyone suspected of a crime does not
establish custody. In spite of the potential for coercion that lesser restraints may involve, it is only deprivation of freedom of action through
restraints of a degree associated with formal arrest that are significant
enough to bring the situation within the stated rationale of Miranda and
its progeny.
II.

THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT'S STANDARD: FREEDOM TO LEAVE

The approach of the Colorado Supreme Court involves four mistaken
assumptions, all of which inappropriately minimize the importance of
Beheler, Berkemer, and Murphy. These mistaken assumptions are as follows.
First, the two prongs of the Miranda definition of custodial interrogation
mean there are two distinct types of situations in which Miranda warnings
are required: (1) custody after formal arrest, and (2) other lesser degrees
of restraints on freedom of action. Second, the test for custody from these
54. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682-88 (1985).
55. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980); see also People v. Tottenhoff,
691 P.2d 340, 344 (Colo. 1984).
56. Betk-me, 468 U.S. at 440 (quoting Californiav. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)).

57. Id.
58. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
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three cases applies mainly to traffic stops. Third, the test for custody
otherwise applies only in "obvious" cases in which one has been taken into
custody, as in formal arrest. Fourth, the essential factor for determining
custody is whether a person would feel free to leave.
A.

The Development of the "Not Free to Leave" Standard

The Colorado Supreme Court begins its analysis of custody with language from Miranda, custodial interrogation means questioning "after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way." 59 The court then states that this determination requires "an objective assessment" from the point of view of "a reasonable person in the defendant's circumstances" made through a
60
consideration of the "totality of the circumstances."
In developing its approach, the Colorado Supreme Court has distinguished the first prong of the Miranda definition of custodial interrogation. Being "taken into custody" 61 is considered to be different from the
second prong, restraints which deprive one of freedom of action in any
significant way. 62 Because one is normally taken into custody through
arrest, the more problematic determination under this approach has been
the court's effort to describe the restraints by which one is "otherwise de63
prived of his freedom of action in any significant way."
Although the U.S. Supreme Court decided Mirandain 1966, not until
1983 did the Court clearly tie custody to restraints "of the degree associated with formal arrest."6 By that time, the Colorado Supreme Court had
held for some time that the determination of whether a person was "deprived of (her) freedom of action in any significant way" under Miranda
turned on "whether she reasonably believed that she was not free to
leave." 65 In 1983 the court explicitly supported this test by equating the
59. Miranda,384 U.S. at 444.
60. People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 203 (Colo. 1984); see also People v. Gennings, 808
P.2d 839, 845 (Colo. 1991); People v. Trujillo, 784 P.2d 788, 791 (Colo. 1990).
61. Miranda,384 U.S. at 444.
62. See, e.g., People v. Parada, 533 P.2d 1121, 1122-23 (Colo. 1975) ("Since neither party
asserts that Parada was 'taken into custody' at the time of the questioning, the question
before this Court is whether she was 'deprived of (her) freedom of action in any significant
way.'"); People v. Algien, 501 P.2d 468, 470-71 (Colo. 1972) ("It is clear under the facts of
this case that defendant was not taken into custody and brought into the sheriff's office....
The question, is, then, did defendant otherwise become deprived of his freedom in any significant way by the circumstances . . . ."). For more recent and explicit examples of this

distinction, see People v. LaFrankie, 858 P.2d 702, 705 (Colo. 1993) ("Custody is not limited
to those situations in which formal arrest has taken place, but also includes those situations
where the person interrogated 'has been significantly deprived of his freedom of action.'"
(citations omitted)); Trujillo, 785 P.2d at 1293 ("A person who is interrogated after having
been taken into police custody in a manner similar to a formal arrest clearly has been subjected to custodial interrogation. The Mirandarequirements also apply to police interrogation conducted under circumstances where the person interrogated has been deprived of
her freedom of action in a significant way." (citations omitted)).
63. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
64. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983).
65. Parada,533 P.2d at 1122-23; see also Algien, 501 P.2d at 471 (stating the test is
"whether under the circumstances a reasonable man would believe himself to be deprived of
his freedom in any significant way"; discussing the facts from which "a reasonable person
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Fifth Amendment Mirandainquiry with the test under United States v. Men67
denhal16 6 for a Fourth Amendment investigatory seizure.
B.

Temporary Adoption of the Berkemer Test

In 1986, the court adopted the test from Berkemer without mentioning
its prior "not free to leave" test.68 In People v. Archuleta, the court held
roadside questioning of a motorist detained for a routine traffic stop is not
necessarily custodial interrogation. 69 In People v. Wallace, the court
reached the same result in a situation involving a traffic accident with
70
injuries.
The court said in Archuleta that under Berkemer and Beheler, "Miranda
warnings only need be given when the motorist's freedom of action is curtailed to a 'degree associated with formal arrest.'"71 In Wallace the trial
court had formulated the inquiry for custody as whether one could consider himself "under arrest or in custody, or at least not able to leave or
not answer questions." 72 In an apparent effort to correct this statement of
the inquiry, the Colorado Supreme Court stated, "[w]e have held the question of custody turns on an objective assessment of whether a reasonable
person in the suspect's position would believe himself to be deprived of
his freedom of action to the degree associated with formal arrest." 73 The
court found the transition to custody occurred when, under an objective
examination of the circumstances, one would have understood he was being subjected "to the functional equivalent of a formal arrest" or to "re74
straints comparable to those associated with formal arrest."
The court in Wallace mistakenly applied three cases, claiming each
held custody should be determined by reference to restraints associated
would with logic conclude that he could not leave the premises of his own free will but would
be detained for formal arrest."). For more recent applications of this approach, see infra
notes 86 & 87 and accompanying text.
66. 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980).
67. People v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 958, 962 (Colo. 1983) ("the standards to be employed
in determining the meaning of 'custody' under the fifth amendment for purposes of Miranda
and 'seizure' for purposes of the fourth amendment are identical ... ."). See also infra notes
86 & 87 and accompanying text.
68. People v. Wallace, 724 P.2d 670 (Colo. 1986); People v. Archuleta, 719 P.2d 1091
(Colo. 1986). Although the U.S. Supreme Court test for custody of formal arrest or restraints
of a "degree associated with arrest" has often been associated with Berkemer, which involved a
traffic stop, the Colorado Supreme Court acknowledged in Archueta that this test was recognized in Beheer, a murder case. See Archuleta, 719 P.2d at 1093. Murphy, a murder and rape
case, also applied this test. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430 (1984). Any reference hereafter to the "Berkemer test" should be understood as a reference to the test developed in Beheler, Murphy and Berkemer.
69. Archueta, 719 P.2d at 1093.
70. Wallace, 724 P.2d at 673.
71. Archuleta, 719 P.2d at 1092 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440
(1984)).
72. Wallace, 724 P.2d at 673.
73. Id.
74. Archuleta, 719 P.2d at 1093-94 (Quinn, J., concurring).
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with formal arrest.75 In fact, none of the three cases reached such a holding. In People v. Viduya, the court declined to rule on whether the test
from Berknerapplied to accident investigations, as opposed to mere traffic
stops, but remanded and invited the trial court to consider the applicability of Berkemer.76 Similarly, in People v. Black the court declined to decide
whether the Berkemer test applied to accident investigations with injuries. 71
People v. Johnson predated Berkemer, and the court made no reference to
this test from Beheler either; to the contrary, the court, after equating
Fourth Amendment investigatory seizures under Mendenhall with custody
for Fifth Amendment purposes under Miranda, held that custody means
78
being "not free to leave."
In Wallace, the court not only followed the U.S. Supreme Court's lead
in limiting custody to where there are restraints of "a degree associated
with arrest," but also suggested, through its citations to Viduya, Black, and
79
Johnson, that this focus on arrest was established doctrine in Colorado.
Because none of these cases involved this doctrine, the court appeared to
be making a major clarification in its prior approach to custody under
Miranda. This clarification would bring the Colorado approach in line
with Beheler, Murphy, and Berkemer. In People v. Milhollin,80 the court appeared to confirm this change when it cited Berkemer to reverse a suppression order. The court held no evidence existed by which the driver, who
was questioned in the hospital after a traffic accident, could have "reasonably believed that his freedom of action had been curtailed by the officer
to a degree associated with a formal arrest."81
C.

Return to the Pre-Berkemer Approach in Non-traffic Situations

If such a clarification was intended, it has not carried through to subsequent cases-particularly in non-traffic situations. Since Archuleta and
Wallace, the Colorado Supreme Court has decided many non-traffic cases
without reference to the Berkemer test at all. Only in Milhollin, another
traffic case, did it again apply the Berhemer test.
Although Berkemer was a traffic case, it was based on Beheler, a murder
case. In Murphy, a murder and rape case, the U.S. Supreme Court applied
the same test. There is, therefore, no authority for limiting the Berkemer
test to traffic cases. The facts and reasoning of the three cases, as well as
the cases on which they depend, establish the Berkemer test was a conscious
effort to define custody in terms of arrest or the restraints associated with
arrest for all cases. This definition is based on the premise that Miranda
75. Wallace, 724 P.2d at 673 (citing People v. Viduya, 703 P.2d 1281, 1286 (Colo. 1985));
People v. Black, 698 P.2d 766, 768 (Colo. 1985); People v.Johnson, 671 P.2d 958, 961 (Colo.
1983).
76. Viduya, 703 P.2d at 1287.
77. Black, 698 P.2d at 768 n.6.
78. Johnson, 671 P.2d at 692.
79. Wallace, 724 P.2d at 673.
80. 751 P.2d 43 (Colo. 1988).
81. Id. at 52.
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itself is limited to those situations in which there is police domination
through significant restraints on freedom of action.
Nonetheless, in numerous non-traffic cases 82 the Colorado Court has
continued to rely on the original unrefined language in Miranda-"deprived of his or her freedom of action in any significant way."83 In
Berkemer, the defendant relied heavily on this phrase in an effort to have
the Court find roadside questioning to be custodial interrogation; but the
84
U.S. Supreme Court declined "to accord [the phrase] talismanic power."
Instead the Court emphasized that "[i]t is well settled that the safeguards
prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom
85
of action is curtailed to a 'degree associated with formal arrest."
Despite Berkemer, the Colorado Supreme Court continues to give talismanic power to the language of being deprived of freedom of action "in
any significant way." It has often explained the meaning of this phrase by
referring to being "not free to leave." 86 The court did so most recently
and most emphatically in People v. Thomas. After defining custody with this
language from Miranda,the court asserted "[t] he essential element of custody is that a reasonable person in the suspect's position would feel that
he is not free to leave." 8 7 The court has retreated from the recognition it
briefly gave to Berkemer, and reaffirmed the Mendenhall "not free to leave"
formulation as the test for custody outside the traffic stop situation.
82. See, e.g., People v. LaFrankie, 858 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1993); People ex reLJ.C., 844 P.2d
1185 (Colo. 1993); People v. Thomas, 839 P.2d 1179 (Colo. 1992); People v. Hamilton, 831
P.2d 1326 (Colo. 1992); People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839 (Colo. 1991); People v. Probasco,
795 P.2d 1330 (Colo. 1990); People v. Horn, 790 P.2d 816 (Colo. 1990); People v. Trujillo,
785 P.2d 1290 (Colo. 1990); People v. Trujillo, 784 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1990); People v. Cleburn,
782 P.2d 784 (Colo. 1989); People v. Sandoval, 736 P.2d 1201 (Colo. 1987); People v. Harper,
726 P.2d 1129 (Colo. 1986).
83. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
84. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984).
85. Id. (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)).
86. See Gennings, 808 P.2d at 845 (stating the test to be the objective application of the
language "deprived of his freedom of action in a significant manner" from Miranda, but
finding the evidence did not support the conclusion that the defendant was "somehow deprived of his freedom to leave the room at any time ... ."); Probasco,795 P.2d at 1334 (stating
the same test from Mirandaand then disapproving the trial court's finding that the defendant was in shock, suggesting "that he was not free to leave," as insufficiently supported);
C/eburn, 782 P.2d at 786 (stating the same test from Miranda, but then, in explaining this
determination of custody was factual, inquiring as to "whether a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave."); People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 203 (Colo.1984)
("The question of custody turns on an objective assessment of whether a reasonable person
in the defendant's circumstances would have believed that he was free to leave the officer's
presence."); see also LaFrankie,858 P.2d at 706-07 (referring favorably to the trial court's finding that the defendant "was not aware that he was free to leave."); Thomas, 839 P.2d at 1179
(the "essential element of custody is that a reasonable person in the suspect's position would
feel that he is not free to leave.").
As shown above, being "not free to leave" is the test for investigatory stops under Mendenhal, which are lesser seizures than arrests.
87. Thomas, 839 P.2d at 1179. This statement of the essential element came after the
Court had stated the test to be "whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would
consider himself deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at 1178.
Under the Court's approach, being deprived of freedom of action in any significant way must
be the same as feeling not free to leave.
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D. Distinguishing Custody and Significant Deprivations of Freedom of Action
for the Application of Berkemer
The Colorado Supreme Court has also suggested the Berkemer test provides answers only to the easy cases, in which the issue is whether the defendant has been taken into custody under the "first prong" of the
Miranda definition of custodial interrogation. In People v. Trujillo, the
court stated:
A person obviously is "in custody" when that person is subjected
to the constraints associated with a formal arrest. The Miranda
requirements, however, are not limited to formal arrests, but also
include police interrogation conducted under circumstances
where the person interrogated
has been significantly deprived of
88
his freedom of action.
In this way, the court has minimized the importance of the Berkemer
test, relegating it to determinations of obvious examples of custody. The
court assumes that if there are restraints associated with arrest, there is
also an arrest. As shown above, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has said
"the ultimate inquiry" for determining whether an interrogation is custodial is "whether there is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with formal arrest."8 9 The U.S. Supreme
Court has recognized that police might impose restraints associated with
arrest without making a formal arrest, and has held that it is only when
they do so that Miranda warnings must precede questioning.
The Colorado Supreme Court relegated the Berkemer test to "obvious"
cases by disregarding the historical and doctrinal context in which the
Berkemer test evolved. The "test" applied by the Colorado Supreme Court
is based on language from Miranda which the U.S. Supreme Court has
subsequently refused to give "talismanic power." 90 On the other hand,
this language, which the Colorado Supreme Court limits to obvious cases
of custody, was used by the U.S. Supreme Court to describe more than
that. It clarified Miranda by describing the important but limited situations in which police have so dominated the situation that the restraints
are "significant" for purposes of triggering the requirements of Miranda.
The Colorado Supreme Court's analysis is inconsistent with established doctrine because it continues to distinguish the two prongs in the
Miranda definition of custodial interrogation as if they involve different
88. People v. Trujillo, 784 P.2d 788, 791 (Colo. 1990). In footnote 2, which accompanies this text, the Trujillo court discussed Orowzco, Bekemer, Murphy, and Beheler, but only to

demonstrate "a fact-specific approach" taken by the U.S. Supreme Court, and not for their
focus on restraints associated with arrest as the basis for custody. Id. at 794 n.2.
The court made the same point in Thomas, stating: "'A person is obviously in custody
when that person has been subjected to the constraints associated with a formal arrest.' The
test is'an objective one: whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would consider himself deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Thomas, 839 P.2d at
1178 (quoting Trujillo, 784 P.2d at 791).
89. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (emphasis added) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)). See discussion supra pt. I.D.
90. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984). See supra text accompanying note
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degrees of restraint. The Ber*ener test was adopted by the U.S. Supreme
Court to demonstrate that both prongs of the Mirandadefinition of "custodial interrogation" are based on those significant restraints associated
with arrest.9 1 It is, as Justice Quinn recognized in his concurrence in
Archuleta, formal arrest or the functional equivalent of formal arrest which
triggers Miranda,92 and nothing less.
By emphasizing the question whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would feel free to leave, the Colorado Supreme Court has
continued to apply the test for Tery investigatory stops. This confuses
lesser Fourth Amendment seizures with arrest, and by its terms requires
the Miranda advisement in both circumstances. Yet the U.S. Supreme
Court has said investigatory stops are not subject to the dictates of Miranda,and that only when freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with arrest do the protections of Miranda become applicable. In
this way, the Colorado Supreme Court's approach is inconsistent with setfled U.S. Supreme Court doctrine on custody,
A person is obviously in custody after a formal arrest. But a significant
deprivation of freedom of action for purposes of determining custody
under Miranda may also occur in the absence of formal arrest, but only
when one has been subjected to significant restraints. The restraints must,
however, be of a degree associated with formal arrest, as explained in Miranda's progeny. The test under Beheler, Berkemer, and Murphy demonstrates the high degree of police domination, comparable to that effecting
a formal arrest, that is necessary before there is a sufficient restraint on
one's freedom of action to trigger the requirements of Miranda. The Colorado test allows the requirements of Miranda to be extended far beyond
the limited situations established by the U.S. Supreme Court.
E.

The Lack of a Useful Frame of Reference For Police and Lower Courts

The Colorado Supreme Court has said it defers to the trial judge's
determination of custody as long as the "correct test" was stated and the
totality of the circumstances appeared to have been considered. Specifically, the court stated:
We take this occasion to emphasize once again that the issue of
custody is essentially a factual question that involves a trial court's
assessment of the credibility of witnesses and a weighing of their
testimony. .

.

. Our role as an appellate court is to review the

record and determine whether the trial court's findings of historical fact are adequately supported by competent evidence and
whether the court applied the correct legal standard to these
findings in resolving the issue before it ....

Where, as here, the

historical findings are adequately supported by competent evidence, and where, as here, the trial court applied the correct
91. Berkemer, 468 U.S at 437. See suprapts. I.C., I.D.
92. People v. Archuleta, 719 P.2d 1091, 1093-94 (Colo. 1986) (Quinn, J., concurring).
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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legal standard to those findings in suppressing evidence, we will
93
not overturn the court's suppression ruling.
The Colorado Supreme Court has repeatedly provided a list of facts
that might be considered in determining whether one has been subjected
to any significant restraints, such as:
The time, place, and purpose of the encounter; the persons present during the interrogation; the words spoken by the officer to
the defendant; the officer's tone of voice and general demeanor;
the length and mood of the interrogation; whether any limitation of movement or other form of restraint was placed on the
defendant during the interrogation; the officer's response to any
questions asked by the defendant; whether directions were given
to the defendant during the interrogation; and the
defendant's
94
verbal or non-verbal response to such directions.
When this fact-based analysis is applied to the question whether one
would be reasonable in feeling not free to leave, diverse results occur because there is no useful frame of reference for the analysis. One can feel
"not free to leave" in situations that fall short of custody; for example the
natural apprehension of a suspect in the face of the inherent power of
police or because of police authority to insist upon an investigatory stop.
The word "custody" loses any resemblance to its normal meaning if the
frame of reference is the lesser degree of restraint associated with such
situations. This deprives Miranda of its clarity-one of its announced
95
virtues.
93. People v. Trujillo, 784 P.2d 788, 792 (Colo. 1990) (citations omitted). See aLso People v. LaFrankie, 858 P.2d 702, 706 (Colo. 1993) (court emphasized the factual nature of the
inquiry).
94. People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193, 203 (Colo. 1984); see also LaFrankie,858 P.2d at 705;
People v. Probasco, 795 P.2d 1330, 1332 (Colo. 1990); People v. Horn, 790 P.2d 816, 818
(Colo. 1990); TrujiUo, 784 P.2d at 791; People v. Wallace, 724 P.2d 670, 673 (Colo. 1986).
95. In Berkemer, the Court rejected the effort to exclude misdemeanor traffic offenses
from the requirements of Miranda. It emphasized that "[o]ne of the principal advantages of
the doctrine that suspects must be given warnings before being interrogated while in custody
is the clarity of that rule." Ber*emer, 468 U.S. at 430. Because police would not necessarily
know the degree of the offense they were investigating when they begin to interrogate, "[ilt
would be unreasonable to expect the police to make guesses as to the nature of the criminal
conduct at issue before deciding how they may interrogate the suspect." Id. at 431.
The Court in Berkemer quoted Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979), to establish
that "Miranda'sholding has the virtue of informing police and prosecutors with specificity as
to what they may do in conducting custodial interrogation, and of informing courts under
what circumstances statements during such interrogation are not admissible." Berkemer, 468
U.S. at 430. The Court in Fare used this language to support its holding that a juvenile's
request to speak to his probation officer was not the same as a request to have an attorney
present. The Court said if ajuvenile's request for anyone he considered trustworthy enough
to give him reliable advice would trigger the rule of Miranda,such a result "would cut this
court's holding in [Miranda] completely loose from its own explicitly stated rationale." Fare,
442 U.S. at 723. Neither police nor the courts could tell when questioning had to cease when
a suspect asked to speak to a "trustworthy" person. Id. That lack of clarity was inconsistent
with the focus on attorneys in Miranda,which did provide clarity to guide police and courts.
Both decisions are based on the clarity that is provided to police, prosecutors, and
courts. That clarity also supports the Court's focus on "restraints associated with arrest" as
necessary for custody. Otherwise the application of the rule can turn on factors more and
more remote from custody and the underlying rationale of Miranda. Police, prosecutors, and
courts do not have clear direction on when that rule comes into play if it turns on restraints
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The Colorado Supreme Court cites Orozco, Beheler, Murphy, and
Berkemer as demonstrating "a fact specific approach" taken by the U.S.
Supreme Court.96 This seriously disregards the significant doctrinal lesson of these progeny of Miranda. Rather than merely providing examples
of facts to consider, these cases establish the goal for the factual analysis.
This goal is to determine whether police have effected custody through "a
formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with formal arrest."9 7 The U.S. Supreme Court has provided guidance to Miranda by refining the meaning of custody, whereas the
Colorado Supreme Court has consistently overlooked the significance of
that refinement.
F. Frequent Reversals and Strained Results Under the Colorado Approach
The differences between the test for custody used by the U.S.
Supreme Court and that used by the Colorado Supreme Court is not
merely a matter of semantics. The use of the law of arrest to define the
limitations of Miranda provides relatively clear standards. The Colorado
Supreme Court has not provided similar clarity. As a result, Miranda has
often been applied expansively, burdening the Colorado courts with frequent reversals and inconsistent results.
Although the Colorado test comes directly from Miranda,which was
decided in 1966, trial courts were reversed years later for applying the
"wrong test."9 8 The Colorado Supreme Court has also reversed suppression orders because the trial court failed to consider the totality of the
circumstances. 99 Even when trial courts have stated the "totality of the
that are not clearly identifiable in terms of the concerns addressed in Miranda and its
progeny.
96. TrujiUo, 784 P.2d at 791 n.2.
97. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (internal quotations omitted).
98. E.g., People v. Sandoval, 736 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Colo. 1987) (trial court suppressed
because the officer would have been remiss had he allowed the defendant to leave after he
admitted killing someone; remanded for determination of custody issue because the existence of probable cause to arrest does not control the determination of custody); People v.
Viduya, 703 P.2d 1281, 1287 (Colo. 1985) (trial court denied a motion to suppress because
the officer did not yet have reason to suspect a crime, nor had he focused on the defendant
as a suspect; reversed for failure to determine whether there was custody); People v. Corley,
698 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Colo. 1985) (trial court had suppressed statements because the investigation had focused on the suspect; reversed because Mirandahad substituted custodial interrogation for the "focus of the investigation" test from Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964)); People v.Johnson, 671 P.2d 958, 960 (Colo. 1983) (trial court based its suppression
order on the subjective beliefs of the suspect and the officer, and on the assumption that
warnings were required before the police could ask the "ultimate question" of "did he do it";
remanded because of the need for findings on whether there was custody).
99. E.g., People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839, 845 (Colo. 1991) (trial court had improperly
"focused on the defendant's subjective apprehension about his job status with the police
department."); People v. Thiret, 685 P.2d 193,202-03 (Colo. 1984) (reversing trial court, first
for focusing "essentially on one circumstance only, the number of officers at the scene," and
then for focusing on the fact later statements were made to a polygraph examiner at the
station-house).
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circumstances" test or have listed a number of facts from the record, they
have been reversed for relying on just one fact. 1°'
In spite of the avowed deference with which such decisions are supposed to be reviewed, the Colorado Supreme Court has also reversed
when the trial court stated the correct test and considered appropriate
circumstances. In People v. Probasco,10 1 the trial court suppressed statements made by a police officer in his patrol car to other officers after he
shot a man during a traffic stop. The trial court suppressed the statements
based largely on the facts that (1) the defendant was found leaning over
the victim's body, and (2) he was initially reluctant to converse, which suggested to the trial court a reasonable feeling that he was not free to
leave. 10 2 Although the Colorado Supreme Court found these considerations appropriate, it reversed because the trial court's examination of the
03
facts was "too limited."1
The Probasco court relied on Murphy for the premise that "this extraordinary safeguard does not apply outside the context of the inherently
coercive custodial interrogation for which it was designed. " 10 4 The court
emphasized the officer was in his employment situation, which was familiar (e.g., he was in his own patrol car); therefore, any compulsion was due
to his obligations as an employee.' 0 5 In addition, the court found
10 6
Probasco was not free to leave, but for reasons unconnected to custody.
As threatening as Probasco's situation was, and as clear as it was that
he was not free to leave, the Colorado Supreme Court held he was not in
100. E.g., People ex rel.J.C., 844 P.2d 1185, 1189-90 (Colo. 1993) (trialjudge stated it was
considering the totality of the circumstances and listed several facts that were considered in
finding police questioning of a juvenile over the telephone to be custodial, but the Supreme
Court found only the age ofjuvenile was considered); Trujilo, 785 P.2d at 1292-93 (trial court
stated it was considering the totality of the circumstances, but was reversed for failing to do so
on an objective, reasonable person standard, relying instead upon the "subjective mind of
the defendant."); see also People v. LaFrankie, 858 P.2d 702, 709 (Colo. 1993) (Mullarkey, J.,
dissenting) ("Although the trial court, at the outset of its order, correctly states this objective
test for deciding whether the defendant was in custody, the remainder of the order raises
serious doubts as to whether the court correctly applied that test in this case."; pointing out
the trial court had stated Mirandarequirements were triggered "whenever a police interview
is designed to elicit a confession.").
101. 795 P.2d 1330 (Colo. 1990).
102. Id. at 1331-32.
103. Id. at 1333.
104. Id. (quoting Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430 (1984)).
105. Id. at 1334-35. Cf. LaFrankie,858 P.2d 702, 706 n.5 (Colo. 1993) (court supported its
conclusion the interrogation at the suspect's workplace was custodial with the statement that
"there can be few places more intimidating or potentially coercive to an individual than one's
place of employment."). It is surprising the Court made such an assertion of fact without any
support in the record and without the foundation for judicial notice. See id. at 710 (Mullarkey, J., dissenting) (describing this assertion as "a false generalization and not an accurate
statement of the law."). Equally troubling, however, is the Court's failure to recognize, that
to the extent its assumption is accurate, any "intimidating and potentially coercive" pressures
in the workplace are due to the domination of the employer over his employees, and not to
the "police dominated atmosphere' that is critical to the Miranda decision. See supra pts. I.C,
I.D.
106. Probasco, 795 P.2d, at 1334 (the reasons included: the officer was a witness, and his
clothing and weapons might be evidence),
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custody.10 7 The court acknowledged that the trial court's findings of fact
were entitled to deference, and it did not disavow the "not free to leave"
test.10 8 Instead, it held the trial court had not evaluated the circumstances
properly and corrected the factual finding because it was "[a]n ultimate
conclusion of constitutional law that is inconsistent with or unsupported
by evidentiary findings."' ° 9 The Colorado court could have reached the
same result with less strain, and with more guidance for future cases, had
it relied on Murphy and found that Probasco was not in custody because he
had not been subjected to restraints to a degree associated with formal
arrest.
Different facts, however, have led the court to uphold suppression
orders. The cases are difficult to reconcile with Probascoand impossible to
reconcile with Beheler, Murphy and Berkemer.
In People v. Cleburn,1 10 two officers, one of whom knew the suspect,
went to his remote home because the description given by the victim of a
crime matched the defendant. They spoke with the suspect and his wife in
the kitchen of their home. The trial court cryptically described the interchange as a "sort of 'good old boy' scenario."1 11 The court found the
questioning to be custodial because the two armed officers initiated the
conversation about a crime for the purpose of obtaining incriminating evidence; they used "subtle, coercive influence.., as a friend;" and the discussion was relatively long. 12 The Colorado Supreme Court stated these
facts adequately supported the finding that someone in the defendant's
position "would consider himself deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.113 The court supported this holding with the statement
that "It]he determination of whether an interrogation is custodialwhether a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to
14
leave-is a factual determination."'
In People v. Hamilton,115 the victim reported a theft and identified a
suspect with whom he was acquainted. The next day the victim called the
police to report the suspect had returned. When an officer arrived, the
victim met him in the yard and reported the suspect had admitted the
theft.' 16 The officer approached the suspect and asked: "What's happening here between you and Mr. Worley?" 117 The suspect then confessed.
The trial court found this situation to be custodial because a reasonable
person would believe he was about to be arrested and was not free to
11 8
leave.
107. Id. at 1335.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110.
111.
112.

782 P.2d 784 (Colo. 1989).
Id. at 785.
Id. at 786 (the discussion lasted 20 to 30 minutes).

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id. at 786-87.
831 P.2d 1326 (Colo. 1992).
Id. at 1328.
Id. at 1329.
Id. at 1330.
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Cleburn and Hamilton did not involve evidence of the police imposing
restraints of any kind. In Hamilton the officer only asked, "What's happening?" 11 9 In Cleburn the fact the officer knew the suspect was treated as a
serious restriction on the freedom to leave, overriding the more obvious
facts that the suspect was at his home and had expressed no desire to
leave. 120 These decisions seem to turn on the assumption that when people know the police have reason to suspect a crime, and might be about to
arrest them, they are significantly restricted and in custody. This either
makes the result turn on the subjective fears of the defendant or on the
subjective belief of the police that they have grounds to arrest the defendant. Each of these concerns, however, has been held to be an improper
basis for a determination of custody because the test is objective not subjective. 12 1 Otherwise these cases turn on the coercion inherent when po122
lice question a suspect, but that too is not a basis for finding custody.
In People v. Horn,123 the defendant went to the station at the request
of the police. He was repeatedly told he was free to leave, and he was not
arrested. These circumstances often support a finding that the situation
was not custodial. The court found the suspect was in custody.' 24 The
facts relied upon for that conclusion were: he denied the charges; he was
accused of lying several times; he was left alone twice to reconsider his
responses; he was urged to take a polygraph; he was encouraged to confess
for the therapeutic value to the victim; the size of the windowless interrogation room, which was in the basement of the police station; the 30-minute length of the interview; and the presence of only the suspect and the
officer. 12 5 The court concluded "the sole purpose of the questioning was
26
to obtain a confession from the defendant."
The result in Horn depended heavily on the accusatorial nature of the
questioning. Yet being accused of a crime is not the same as being literally
in custody. 12 7 To have a belief that the police can place you in custody is
not the same as being in custody. Accusing someone of lying establishes
suspicion, but suspicion does not trigger Miranda warnings. 12 8 The fact
police are seeking a confession only confirms they are interrogating a suspect, 129 not that it is taking place in custody. Horn was subjected to an
intensive interrogation, but that is a separate issue from whether the interrogation took place in custody.13 0 None of the facts relied upon by the
119. Id. at 1329.
120. People v. Cleburn, 782 P.2d 784, 787 (Colo. 1989).
121. See supra note 19; see also People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839, 845 (Colo. 1981).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 29-34.
123. 790 P.2d 816 (Colo. 1990).
124. Id. at 818-19.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 819.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 40-48.
128. See supra pt. I.C.
129. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (stating an interrogation under Miranda is defined as any words or actions on the part of the police officer that the officer
"should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.").
130. To the extent the methods of interrogation used in a non-custodial setting may be
excessively coercive-overbearing the suspect's will to resist-the more appropriate analysis

DENVER UMVERS/TY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:2

Colorado Supreme Court involved restraints imposed by the police that
were to a degree associated with arrest, especially because he was told he
was free to leave, and he was in fact allowed to leave.
In People v. LaFrankie,13 1 the court affirmed a suppression order. The
defendant's employer suspected him of stealing a computer. Two detectives interviewed him in the office of the company president. The trial
court stated the test to be whether "a reasonable person would have considered himself deprived of his freedom of action in a significant manner."132 It also listed several facts said to demonstrate consideration of the
totality of the circumstances.
Yet, the trial court also emphasized that:
[T] he purpose of the interview was to get the defendant to confess, that is what custodial interrogation is about and that is what
Miranda is about. If you are going to interview somebody who
you are going to try to get a confession from, you at least have to
advise them of their rights. That is what
Mirandais about, other33
wise, Miranda doesn't mean anything.'
The majority found this statement of the law "misleading"; however, the
court concluded that it did not taint the suppression order because the
trial court recited the correct test and considered several facts.' 3 4 The
35
three person dissent agreed with the majority on the test to be applied,
but disagreed on whether the trial court had properly applied that test.
The dissent would have reversed and remanded because of the emphasis
given by the trial court to its "misleading" view of Miranda.'3 6 The dissent
emphasized that the trial court also found the interview by the police to be
low-key and truthful, so that the statements were voluntary, even though
3 7
the same circumstances had led it to hold the situation was custodial.'
would be for voluntariness under the due process clause, rather than expanding the concept
of custody to settings that are beyond the rationale of Miranda.
131. 858 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1993).
132. Id. at 706.
133. Id. at 709 n.2 (Mullarkey,J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 706-08. Although not establishing a per se rule, the court likely encouraged
future courts to focus on whether the police wanted the suspect to confess as a trigger for
Mirandawarnings, by stating "the purpose of an encounter is one of the prominent factors
which should be considered in determining if a reasonable person would feel deprived of his
freedom of action in a significant way." Id. at 706 n.3. As Justice Mullarkey points out in her
dissent, however, giving such prominence to the purpose of the interview "shifts the focus of
the custody inquiry from the objective test... to a subjective inquiry, previously rejected by
this court, into the state of mind of the interviewing officers." Id. at 709 (Mullarkey, J., dissenting). This is an example of how the various facts to be considered under the Colorado
approach can merge too easily with factors that are not to be considered. This occurs because no adequate framework exists for analyzing the degree of restraints that are sufficiently
significant to bring into play the underlying rationale of Miranda.
135. In addition, the majority and the dissent apparently agreed that the test for the
determination of custody under Beher,Murphy, and Berkemer was not relevant to their own
determination of custody; neither opinion mentions the "well-settled" and "ultimate" inquiry
under those U.S. Supreme Court decisions.
136. Id. at 708 (Mullarkey, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 710 (Mullarkey, J., dissenting). Judge Mullarkey noted:
The trial court's focus on the "accusatory" tone and content of the interview in its
analysis of the custody issue, when contrasted with its approval of the officers' "soft
approach" under its voluntariness analysis, suggests that the trial court's misreading
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DETERMINATION OF CUSTODY

The majority and the dissent totally disagreed on the meaning and
significance of the facts recited by the trial court. They also disagreed on
whether the trial court had in fact applied the proper test. The "misleading" statements of the trial court about the purpose of Miranda, and the
sharply divided opinions in LaFrankie,demonstrate the test of the Colorado Supreme Court has not provided an adequate analytical basis for understanding the issue of custody for purposes of Miranda.
The Colorado Supreme Court presents its written decisions several
months after both sides have briefed the issues, during which law clerks
and justices have done their own research, and the court has discussed
proposed rulings and reviewed drafts of opinions. In contrast, trial courts
often must decide motions that do not clearly identify the factual or legal
issues. They usually rule orally from the bench immediately after hearing
the evidence. Given this difference in the constraints of decision making,
it is not surprising the Colorado Supreme Court is often able to characterize the lower court as having applied the wrong test or considered too few
circumstances. Yet such "errors" are inevitable given the vague fact-based
test repeatedly imposed by the Colorado Supreme Court. This test does
not provide an adequate frame of reference for effective application given
the pressures under which the trial courts make their decisions. It likewise
does not provide adequate guidance for police.
These cases demonstrate the lack of guidance provided by the "correct test" of the Colorado Supreme Court. The phrase "deprived of freedom in any significant way" does not explain to police officers or trial
courts how to judge what restraints are "significant." Likewise, the words
"not free to leave" and "totality of the circumstances" do not explain the
type or degree of restraints that are significant enough to make a setting
custodial. The Colorado test does not provide a frame of reference for
evaluating the facts to determine when a setting is custodial. As a result,
trial courts often have deviated from it or applied it incorrectly.
The results in these cases demonstrate that the inquiry required by
the Colorado Supreme Court has led to much second-guessing and to an
inappropriately expansive application of Miranda. The only clear lesson
taught by the Colorado Supreme Court is that trial courts should recite
the "correct" test and make lengthy findings of fact. 13 8 In the absence of
a more meaningful legal frame of reference, however, this test will only
lead to uncertainty, inconsistency, and further litigation. To the extent
"feeling not free to leave" is "essential" to the determination of custody, it
is not at all sufficient. Neither is reference to whether one would reasonably feel restrained in any significant way. These Colorado tests for custody do not provide an effective basis for determining whether the
of Mirandafatally infected its reasoning in this case. That is, the trial court appears
to have decided the custody issue based almost exclusively upon its conclusion that
the police officer intended from the outset to procure a confession.
Id.
138. See, e.g., LaFranhi, 858 P.2d at 711 (Mullarkey, J., dissenting) (suggesting the trial
court must not just list facts, but should also analyze or comment on those facts to demonstrate how they weigh for or against a determination of custody).
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restraints on freedom of action involved in a situation are significant
under the concerns addressed in Miranda and its progeny.
CONCLUSION

Better guidance from the Colorado Supreme Court for the determination of custody is needed by trial judges as well as police. The court's
test-whether the person has been deprived of his freedom in any significant way, such that he is not free to leave-has not provided the clarity
that is necessary for an issue with important constitutional implications.
Neither has the frequent repetition that the issue is primarily factual and is
to be judged from an objective point of view under the totality of the circumstances. The lack of direction has only added to the number of motions and appeals and to the inconsistency of results at each stage, with the
burdens these entail. In addition, Miranda has been extended in Colorado beyond its controlling rationale.
The United States Supreme Court has provided the framework for
making the determination of custody based on established principles of
the law of arrest. These principles can be understood and applied by police as well as judges. The "essential inquiry" for the determination of custody is whether there is formal arrest or restraints to a degree associated
with formal arrest. That is the test of the highest court in the land and is
evolved from its own Miranda decision. The Colorado Supreme Court
should end its departure from that controlling doctrine.

